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The author is an associate professor. of religion at Hope College,
Holland, Michigan . He thanks the National Endowment for the
Humanities for a Residential Fellowship for College Teachers, which
fellowship made possible the writing of this article.
Any confrontation of physician and patient concerning treatment
can be viewed from at least two perspectives -the perspective of the
physician and the perspective of the patient. It is hardly necessary to
demonstrate such a truism, but it might be worth our while to provide
a couple of examples.
Case 1: A 68-year old man was admitted to a hospital after a
barium meal had revealed a large carcinoma of his stomach . He had
retired from his own medical practice five years earlier, following a
severe heart attack. The early symptoms of cancer had been mistakenly thought to be effects of his earlier heart attack. By the time it
was diagnosed, the cancer had advanced to his liver and vertebrae. Ten
days after a palliative gastrectomy, he collapsed with a massive pulmonary embolism. An emergency embolectomy was done in the ward.
. When the patient recovered, he asked that, if he had further cardiovascular collapse, no steps should be taken to prolong his life, for the
pain of his cancer was more than he would needlessly continue to
endure. He even wrote a note to that effect in his case records . Even
so, two weeks later, when his heart arrested, he was revived by the
hospital's emergency resuscitation team. Four more times his heart
stopped that night, and four more times he was resuscitated. He lived,
but only to linger in a coma for three weeks. Intravenous nourishment, blood transfusions, and antibiotics were all administered. Preparations were being made to hook him up to an artificial respirator,
but he died before such a plan could be realized. 1
Case 2: An unmarried 26-year-old man, who had always been very
athletic, had recently left the military to join his father's successful
real estate business. They had gone together to appraise some property
~d, unknowingly, had parked their cars near a leaking propane gas
lne. When the young man started the car, he also ignited a severe
:xplosion. The father was killed, and the young man sustained severe
. urns. During the next nine months, he underwent repeated skin graftltlg, removal of his right eye and surgical closing of his left eye in an
attempt to save it, amputation of parts of his fingers on both hands,
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he
and daily baths in a Hubbard tank to control infection. Altho
tent
persistently stated that he did not want to live, he ac_c e?ted trea
until, at the end of nine months , he refused permisswn for f: cher
corrective surgery on his hands and insisted on being disch~r r 1 in
order to go home and die, as he surely would without the dail ~, Iub·
bard baths. In spite of his protests and agony, the painful bath vere
continued. A psychiatric consultant was called in in the h < 2 of
having the young man declared legally incompetent, but conve · ttion
with him only convinced the psychiatrist that the young m : was
legally competent. Indeed, the psychiatrist helped the _youn man
secure legal counsel to obtain his release by ·court _o rder If ne( sary.
The painful treatments continued even as preparatwns were n le to
begin court proceedings. 2
_
.
ation
It is not difficult to multiply examples of this sort of confn
between physician and patient concerning treatment. A n u oer of
recent court cases deal with such confrontations. 3 But these t , cases
are sufficient, I think, to alert us to the differences of the two ·rspec·
tives and to the fact that our emotive responses tend ·som e nes to
support the patient's perspective and claims and sometimes t t 1pport
the physician's perspective and judgment. I propose in this r •er not
to "solve" these cases but to examine the perspectives of pa nt and
physician and to suggest what difference being Christian m and
should make to them.
I. The Perspective of Physicians

In the Hippocratic treatise "The Art," the physician ': ole was
defined as "to do away with the sufferings of the sick, t o .;sen the
violence of their diseases and to refuse to treat those wh. _,re ave~·
m astered by their diseas~s realizing that in such cases 1: dicin~ IS
·
'
.
.
st
powerless." 4 Indeed, if a patient asks for so~e re m e~- ·' agam d
impending death , "if," to quote " The Art" agam, "a ID " de m~is
from an art a power over what does not belong to the ·rt · · ., ,
ignorance is more allied with madness than to lack of k; owled~e .
Physicians saw the good of health and their powerlessn ·ss agam:t
death, so they usually abstained from attempting to treat the m ~rtal Y
ill "those who are overmastered by their diseases." Moreover, m ~he
p~rspective of these physicians of classical antiquity, to relie\·E> suff_erl~g
and to lessen the violence of diseases, it was permissible to ass~st m
suicide. The powers of the art included poisons and other techmques
to produce a pleasant and painless death.
·
c
·
·
h pra ·
The famous Hippocratic Oath, of course, stood ~gamst sue .t nor
tice: " I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody 1f asked for 1 ~ t n
will I make a suggestion to this effect." 5 _T~e oath was wnt
"against the stream " opposing the prevailing perspective and mor ·
'
. of the oat h are unknown.
The date of composition
and the authorship

:s

- ~lstein, the leading interpreter of the .code, argues that it was written by a Pythagorean in the 4th century, B.C. At any rate, the Hippocratic Oath was embraced and supported by the Christian Church and
gradually shaped the physi~ian 's identity and community and, likewise
the perspective of physicians who saw not only the good of health and
the limits to their powers, but also the respect that was due life itself
as a gift of God.6 The physician's identity and community, therefore,
supported and nurtured by the Christian story, prohibited any direct
taking of life. There was not yet any recognition of an obligation to
treat "those who are overmastered by their diseases," to prolong life.
The physician's responsibility toward the dying was simply to tell the
patient to "provide for his soul's health, as that of his body was in
dangerous condition. " 7 .
The physician's perspective, however, was to shift again with the
development of new powers in the art. Francis Bacon added to the
preservation of health and the cure of diseases the prolongation of life,
and he said this "th_ird part of medicine " is "new, and deficient; and
.the most noble of all." s Encouraging physicians to this "most noble"
end, Bacon essentially rejected the old category of "those overmastered by their diseases ' and invited a study of "the cure of diseases
which are held incurable ... since t he pronouncing of these diseases
incurable gives a legal sanction, as it were, to neglect and inattention,
and exempts ignorance from discredit." 9 Bacon's recommendation
was, as he said, imaginative for his time, but it gradually shaped the
physician's perspective as powerfully as t h e once innovative oath had.
The medical community and identity were enlisted on the side of life,
fighting a messy but heroic batt le against death. Their courage was
'their refusal to call any disease incurable; their weapons were forged in
study and research; their allies were the university and its laboratories.
The Baconian . shift in perspective eventually had three effects on
the physician's vision. The physician began to see life as the great good
to be preserved and defended along with health and to see death as the
great evil to be fought and defeated along with suffering. The physician began to see science as the great ally of medicine, indeed, sometimes to see medicine as a science rather than an art. The effect was a
shift of focus from patients to pathologies. I shall refer to this aspect
of the physician's perspective as the " medicalization" of care. I will
~ot deny that it has brought great benefits, but it brings certain costs
m its train, too. The phy&ician 's perspective, insofar as it is allied (and
alloyed?) with the technical and scientific perspective on the persons
who are his patients, denied their particularity, their exceptionality, in
_the interest of treating them as the sum total of the physical and
chemical mechanisms which operate on them according to scientific
~ws. 10 The same alliance denies the patient 's transcendence in the
Interest of treating him or his body as manipulable nature, and it
eschews moral evaluations or instructions in the interest of scientific
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diagnosis and prescription.1 1 What man is that the physician s' Juld
be mindful of him, his particularity, his transcendence, his
oral
agency, is thus subtly threatened by the perspective of the ph) .cian
qua scientist and technologist. 12 A third effect of the Baconiru shift
in perspective is the self-conscious refusal to acknowledge any mits
to the art. If limits are acknowledged, they are . relegated to ; e ill·
defined and shadowy background of a physician's vision.
I do not claim that every physician shares this particular p spective. Some would practice hospitality toward death in some c cumstances.13 Some distinguish themselves not only for their t e tnical
competence but for their humanity toward the persons who a , their
patients and so become "condign of our biased affection and o l ~ctive
praise." 14 I do claim that to belong to the community of ph ~ ,cians
today, to assume the identity of the physician today, is to ha' one 's
own perspective skewed by this perspective. I do not claim th; every
physician can only see things from this perspective but rather t tt any
member of the community of physicians- anyone who assur 'S that
identity - will have his or her own perspective shaped by thi ne. I
do not claim that every physician will adopt or accept a polic stated
by a resident: "As a university teaching service, we tend t o tempt
resuscitation of all patients, particularly at the beginning of the
semester," 15 only that such a statem.ent and such a policy a1 understandable if there is such a perspective operative. I do not cl m that
all physicians would resuscitate the 68-year-old cancer viet 1 , onlY
that such action is quite unintelligible apart from such a pers' ·ctive. I
do not even claim all would continue the Hubbard bath on · •1e burn
victim, only that such a perspective supports such a deCision .
.
II. The Perspective of Patients

The patient's perspective has changed through history as \'>' ell. For
thousands of years, the patient whose disease had "overmas t ered" hirn ·
took control of his own dying. With family and friends gathered in the
dying person's bedroom, the patient presided in a ritual h e had seen
enacted many times before. He would forgive and be forgi ven, instruct
and bless. The patient was, and was expected to be master of his

~~~

'

In Peter DeVries's The Va!e of Laughter, Joe Sandwich 's father is
dying and worries about what his last words will be . He says to Joe
one evening, " What if a man goes in the middle of the ni ght and says
something there 's nobody to hear?" Joe is puzzled and a little irritated
by his father's concern, "seing no reasonable motive for it at all except
the desire to strut your stuff to the end," but he does care for his
father and so, "to cheer him up ," he responds , " It might be something
1
completely trite find worthless, and lucky nobody did hear it." ~
Joe 's father sees in his death and exceptional moment , one t o give hts
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individuality as an urbane unbeliever its definitive form, to "strut his
stuft" if not to the end, at least at the end. But it's an unsupported
role .. There is no ritual or set of mutual expectations to make it
possible. Joe's irritation is a modern one, denying death, and insisting
on a dying that does not disrupt the routine too much or embarrass
the survivors.
The new role for the patient had its origins, too, I suppose, back
when Bacon convinced physicians to pretend there were no incurable
dise~ses. The patient was gradually robbed of the role of the dying and
confmed to a developing '·'sick role." The "sick role" was described
first by Talcott Parsons as a set of permissions and expectations which
society attached to those defined as "sick ." 17 The sick were
exempted from normal social activities and responsibilities, exempted
from blame for their condition, expected to define their own state as
undesirable, and ·obligated to seek competent help and to cooperate in
the process of "getting well." Recently, however, many have undertaken to challenge this role-assignment (and the support it gives to
treatment simply as ~m instance of a certain pathology , rather than as
a per_son) as a violation of the patient's autonomy. The patient's consent 1s required, not only his cooperation in medically indicated treat~ent. The patient should insist upon being treated as an agent, assert~g his rights against the powerful medical perspective, including his
nght to refuse treatment, even life-saving treatment, and to die. The
~ogai).s of "r~ght to die," "~eath wit~ dignity," and "natural death"
1 ~xpress th1s new perspective of patients and those who stand to be
. pabe~ts. It is not my claim that all patients share this particular perspective. Indeed, I really think few do. Most patients quite contente~ly still play the "sick role. " But this new perspective is
em~rgmg, and it exerts pressure not only against physicians but upon
f~t1ents, to?. ~ore and more, it is seen not only as the right, but as
e ~ole-obligation of the patient to determine the course and limits of
medical treatment, to be responsible for one's own dying. Against the
~e~t powers of the medical community- both the powers related to
~~ technology and the powers related to their role-relation to the
pa Ient - and against the powerlessness of his "sick role," the patient
can assert his rights. It is this perspective which makes intelligible the
cancer . vi ct'1m ,s mstruct10n
·
to cease and desist the burn victim's
f
ref usai. of t reat ment, the mconvemenced
.
.
'
.
college professor's
assertiOn

~tha right to smoke in his r<?om (well, at least twice a day) , and sundry
er refusals of treatment, whether prudent or tragic or comic.
III. Toward a Christian Perspective

w~~~ Physician's perspective and the patient's perspective determine
shad ls seen and not seen, what is in the foreground and what is in the
ows • what Is
. Important
.
and what is marginal. As these perspec-
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tives are different, so will be the judgments which are made i, erms
of them. The one who wants to think and act Christianly abo1 these
matters will want to see things from a Christian perspective. · ~re is
more than one way, however, in which that has been (and ' y be)
attempted.
A. Option One: Canonize One Perspective

One option is simply to canonize either the physician's pe.> ective
or the patient's perspective. Indeed, this is very much what
s hap·
pened in the two books which seem to me the most instruct i· on the
moral issues surrounding death and dying. Paul Ramsey's Eth at the
Edges of Life comes very close to canonizing the physician \ ~rspec
tive. According to Ramsey, decisions concerning treatmen ;or the
patient should be "medically indicated." He fears that an err . asis on
the patient's perspective, on the "patient's right to refuse trc ment,"
runs the risk of "subjectivism," 18 "enthrones .. . an arbit y freedom," 19 and makes· a decision "right" simply becaus· it was
made. 20 Moreover, the patient's perspective tends to reduce ~ physician's role to "animated · tools (Aristotle's definit • •1 of a
slave)." 21 Robert Veatch's book Death, Dying, and the ·ological
· · Revolution : Our Last Quest for Responsibility, on the ot ~r hand,
quite candidly advocates the patient's perspective, short o . Jdopting
its slogans. According to Veatch, decisions concerning tre; :n ent are
the patient's to make in his own way and according to his r vn lights.
The physician's perspective may not be allowed to limit r · override
the agency of the patient.22 Not only is the physician's. p o \ •!r limited
by the norm of freedom, the physician's perspective and sense of
special role requirements are rejected as particularisti c special
pleading. 23
Each of these outstanding books articulates and defends the per·
spective it would canonize with both passion and reason ; t he fault of ·
each is the failure to see certain things and to see them a::. important,
thl.ngs which, perhaps, can only be seen and seen as important from
the other perspective. Ramsey fails, I think, to see that t he physician's
judgment about the patient's welfare may not be the same as the
patient's judgment. The physician's focus will (understan dably) be the
welfare of .the patient qua patient rather than the w elfare o~ ~he
patient qua person. The good seen and sought and done by a physician
may be medically "good," but not necessarily humanly " good," a~
least not humanly good as a human person who is the p atient ~~ul
see it and seek it. Moreover, if, as Herman Feifel has shown, physictans
as a group have a considerably higher anxiety in the face of death than
others, ?. 4 that anxiety (and greater than normal desire t o conq~er
death) may lead them to misinterpret the patient ~s welfare. Cano~IZ·
ing the physician's perspective is not free from the danger of subJec·
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tivisr~1, which Ramsey dutifully fights, for enthroning an arbitrary
dommance by the professional (or, at least, what may seem such from
the pati~nt's perspective) and rendering a decision "right': simply
because tt was made by a physician will seem (at least to the patient)
to be equally subjective and more arbitrary.
. . On the ·other hand, Veatch fails, I think, in his advocacy of patient
nght~,. to have any sympathy with physicians or the perspective of
phystct~s. ~is dismissal of the special rol~ responsibilities and special
moral Identity of physicians.is just wrong. Parents, pastors, teachers,
and, not the least, physicians, do have special responsibilities because
t~ey ha~e special roles which affect identity and perspective. Veatch's
smgle-mmded advocacy of patient rights threatens to render the medical profession an "animated tool" (to use Ramsey's phrase and Aris~tle's) to be contracted by patients. Veatch's perspective moreover
IS
.
' Not only'
so dom~ated
by freedom that he overlooks other values.
does he fail to see other values which are constitutive of the medical
Pro!essio~, but also he fails to see - or at least to say -what values a
patient might or should utilize to make a free decision.
~he attempt to canonize either the physician'sperspective or the
~t~ent's perspective, th~n, is ~oomed to ~e myopic, and it is not the
Pbon we should take If we mtend to thmk Christianly about these
matters.

B. Option Two: Adopt an Impartial Perspective
A sec~nd option is to adopt neither the physician's nor the patient's
perspective, but rather a perspective of impartiality. This option
. moral discernment
.
rwould ost enst· ·blY free
from the arbitrary and conm~~nt character of an agent's beliefs, dispositions and loyalties
' taken to be'
im lll.g. d'~scernm~nt and judgment on a moral standard
an~hctt l_ll practical reason itself or at least in the practice of giving
""d hearmg moral reasons. Kant 's "categorical · imperative " Firth's
~ ea} o_bserver," Rawl 's "original position" are all promising' attempts
. parf.rovtde some such place to stand outside of our involvement · in
ca tcular communities and apart from our loyalty to particular
haUses. And a number of Christian ethicists interested in bio-ethics
~hattempted to stand there.
Ullder: s~rengths of such ~ttempts ought not to be overlooked or
hete sbmated. The practical strength of the attempt is that in a
and rog~~eous society like ours, where people with diverse cultural
(and r~hgiO~s histories and communities are forced to live together
the tae ennched by their interaction), the stance of impartiality and
. a basts
. for conversatiOn
.
betws ndard of equal free d om can provide
flicti:~ people of different loyalties and for the adjudication of cong Interests. The moral strength of the attempt is its challenge to

bas
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relationships between independent individuals. When such relations
the arbitrary dominance of one perspective or person over ar .ther.
fail, of course, it is usually appropriate as a kind of last resort to
The theological strength of such an attempt- if care is taken t t artie·
utilize the language of rights and the impartial standard of egual freeulate it - is the acknowledgement that the doctrines of creati 1 and
dom .in an attempt to minimize the damage and danger to the roles
providence are as morally relevant as redemption and sar sificathemselves and to the participants in those roles. On the other hand,
tion.25 Indeed, such an attempt may be particularly import 1t for
to utilize such language or to appeal to such a principle is itself an
Christians as a check against our own religious pride wh 1, for
· indication that the relation is failing, and to rely exclusively on such
example, our confidence in revelation would allow us to dismi cava· language damages and endangers the roles and thus, the persons whose
lierly arguments based on reason (an ad hominem argumen t · 1n the
social fabric is woven of them. Finally, its minimalism can be seen in
scale of an ad humanum argument) or when our loyalty t. God's
cause would allow us to " crusade " for it and to coerce estab ;} ment ' its emphasis on procedural questions, explicitly on the question of
who decides. A fuller account of morality would focus as well on
of it.
The best such approach to our problem may be provided ' James
substantive questions, on the question of what should be decided, and
Jerative
Childress.26 The impartial standard of equal freedom is
on questions of character and virtue, on the question of what the one
when he attempts to distinguish allowing to die from killin1. Characwho decides should be. The minimalism of this approach does not
teristic of this approach, he, !n fact, distinguishes "a right t o e " from
disqualify it from serving moral discernment, but if its minimalism is
"a right to be killed." The right to die, he says, is a negat i right, a
forgotten .or ignored, the moral life can be distorted from this impartial perspective.
claim to noninterfe:rence, while the right to be killed is a pos ve right,
a claim to someone's assistance. The right to noninterferen c s consisAnother weakness of this approach is that the stance of impartial
rationality' requires alienation from ourselves, from our own moral
tent, indeed, entailed by equ.al freedom. The right to a: ;t ance is
interests and loyalties, from our own histories and communities, in
inconsistent with equal freedom, indeed form of arbitr I domin·
order to adopt the impartial point of view.2s We are asked- nay,
ance, making the physician a t 'o ol of the patient's wishet · ' h e same
obliged- by this approach to view our own projects and passions as
impartial perspective is operative when Childress justif; a llowing
though
we were outside objective observers. We are asked by this
patients who choose to refuse treatment to die simply on · ~ grounds
7
approach
to disown- for the sake of morality -the moral projects
that they chose it.2 For the physician or anyone t o 1 . •rride the
and passions which we own as our own and which give us our moral
patient's decision, they must bear the heavy burden of 1 >Of which
character. Now, to be made to pause occasionally and, for the sake of
weighs on anyone who would interfere with another.'s ft i om . TheY
analysis and judgn1ent, to be asked to view things as impartially as we
must show 1) that the patient 's choice was not fully volu. ary , either
can! is not only legitimate but salutary, but neither physicians nor
because of ignorance or incompetence; and 2) that the p,'· ient stands
~ttents nor Christians can consistently live their moral lives like that
to be harmed if his decision is not overridden; 3) that :, ._;h harm IS
With any integrity.
disproportionate when weighed against the good of indept•ndence and
other goods the patient seeks by his decision; 4) that th•' physician's
intervention has a reasonable chance to prevent the h >~ rm ; 5) tha;
C. Option Three: Toward a Christian Perspective
overriding the patient's wishes is a last resort, and 6) that t he means 0
overriding his decision are the least restrictive and insult ing possible.
· I hope enough has been said about the strengths of such a~
The third option for one who would think Christianly about these
approach that I will not be misunderstood now if I attempt to pom.
out its weaknesses and adopt another approach. This approach is JUSt!·
~tters ""--the one I will pursue in the remainder of this paper - is
netth~r to canonize the physician's perspective or the patient's perfiable and important, also fo.r Christians and sometimes especiallY f~r
s~ctiVe, nor to require the · disowning of either perspective for the
Christians, both as the lingua franca to speak as an advocate for t ~
relatively powerless or as a check on our own spiritual and mora
: e of adopting the perspective of impartial rationality. It is rather to
pride. But it is not without its weaknesses.
. ht
w~t ~· Christi~ perspective candidly and unapologetically and to ask
Its fundamental weakness is its minimalism. It does not t ell us w af
h" · t difference 1t can and should make to the Christian· physician and
goods to seek as much as what constraints to exercise in the seeking I~s
pers~ctive, to the Christian patient and his perspective, and to the
them. It tells us not what to do as much as what not to do .. n
~mumty which is called to support and sustain such physicians and
tents.
minimalism show.s up in another way. It tends to -reduce role-relatlD ; 1
ships, husband /wife, teacher /student, doctor/pat ient, t o contractua
Allow me to enter two caveats at the beginning of the undertaking.

a

c:

Pat
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First, it would be presumptuous to claim to articulate the C ~ istian
perspective on even one of the central issues involved in these C( lfron·
tations, say, the Christian perspective on death, and foolhar : 1 pre·
sumption to attempt to develop the Christian perspective ~ot 1ly on
death but also on life, autonomy, professional roles, technolo y , and
dying. That may be the task, finally, but it is and must be a tsk for
communal discernment, not the work of a single Christian r )ralist, ·
however presumptuous he may be. It is a task which will den nd the
special skills and contributions of moralists, clergy, physici ts, and
patients, each speaking from their own perspectives and eac willing
to see things differently because of the common loyalty to G ( . Moral
discourse within the Church may not - and often will not - 'roduce
answers which will have the force of law. But it can...:.... and s: ,1etimes
does - bring cpnflictirig interests and perspectives under the dgment
and renewal of a common loyalty to God. What is undert <' m here,
then is not the last word on these issues, but a modest cont r ution to
'
communal
discourse and discernment.
The second caveat concerns the relation of the · Chrir an com·
munity to non-Christians. I Qo not want to be understood , claiming
moral superiority for Christians. The history of the Cht ·h is too
blemished by religious hatred, holy killing, sanctified co, ;1lacency,
and pious self-righteousness for that sort of claim. M01 .ver, anY
Christian who remains alert to the call to repent and believf ·; unlikely
to indulge in comparisons between his righteousness and t h· dghte~us·
ness of his neighbors. Nor am I even claiming that moral 1istinct1ve·
ness is essential for the Christian life. It would not surprL me- and
it would surely not dismay me- if non-Christian m or ·iists m~e
points similar to those I will make or if non-Christian .. ersons }Jve
lives coherent with ~hem. What I?? want to claim is that Iaithfulne~
to the God Who rru.sed the crucified Jesus from the ead can an
should evoke and sustain certain dispositions and intentior.., . I do want
to claim that Christians are given a peculiar identity t o which theY
may and must be truthful.
.
The tasks undertaken here are to arti~ulate. the ~entral Chris:~
affirmation, and to demonstrate that this affumatwn enables .
requires certain perspectives, dispositions, and intenti ons which, 1~
turn enable and require a critical reconstruction of both the phys~
cian;s perspective and the . patient's perspect!ve. Bo~h becauseC~~
critical reconstruction needs the support and mstructw n of the
an
c
tian community and because even the reconstruct~d per~pec t'IV es cter·
and will see things differently and come into conflict, I fmallY u\an
take to suggest certain opportunities and obligations of t he Chris 1
community in such confrontations.
.
ff rna·
The Christian community started and continues with the aftrna·
tion that God raised the crucified Jesus from the dead. That a ~the
tion was and continues to be not only about an event but aboU
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purpose of God disclosed in the event as well. And it was ~nd c~n
tinues to be formally not merely a proposition, but a self-mvolvmg
utterance equivalent to the acknowledgment that Jesus is Lord.
The affirmation of the resurrection was and continues to be an
affirmation of God's cause and purpose. The resurrection is an eschatological event, disclosing the final triumph of God 's cause and purpose but the cause and purpose are protological, present already and
alwa~s in creation and providEmce. To call it an eschatological event is
to admit that it points ahead to what cannot be seen and to what is
not yet fully experienced. The resurrection, after all, is not like the
resuscitation of the "clinically dead" or even the revivification of
Lazarus. Such are "raised" to die again, but the resurrection of Jesus is
an event in our flesh, our world, and our history which transcends the
enclosures of our mortality and evil, which establishes something new,
but something from which our flesh, our world, and our history have
(happily) no escape. It is something new, but the cause and purpose
whose final triumph ·it discloses and establishes is as old as light. To
call that cause and purpose protological is to claim that it was the
cause and purpose of God from the very beginning; that it is knowable
in creation and proVidence, in revelation and in the Jesus Whom He
raised. The resurrection is the disclosure and guarantee of God's
cosmic sovereignty over His own creation at the end of time. God
intengs the flourishing of His creation, its release from its "bondage to
decay" (Rom. 8:21), and the final victory over death and evil. Go_d
the Creator intends life and its flourishing. In spite of death and evil,
He raised Jesus to His right hand to accomplish His intention for His
creation, and to affirm the resurrection is to affirm even now the
cause and purpose of God.
This affirmation of the resurrection and of God's cause and purpose
was first made and continues to be made in the midst of life under the
sign of the cross, in the midst of the apparent power of sin and death.
The truth about our world is dripping with blood; povertY and pain,
disease and death- that's the truth about our world. And the resurrection of a crucified one neither blinds Christians to this reality nor
makes liars of them. The creation does not yet flourish. People still
die, and die sometim~s horrible deaths.
. In such a world, to.· affirm the resurrection and the cause of God
diSclosed in it was, and continues to be, not merely an objective
Pr~position, but a self-involving commitment. If the crucified One is
Talsed, then, as the early Church said, H~ is Lord, Lord of life and
~eath, Lord of our living and of our dying. If He is ~ord, then all of
~e must be reoriented with Christ at God's right hand; then perspec~IVes must be affected, dispositions and intentions formed and
Informed by this eschatological event. To affirm the resurrection in a
World like this one is to stand in spite of death and evil, to hope for
and Work for life and its flourishing, to align with and identify with
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the Crucified One in the expectation of a resurrection like is, to
refuse to allow evil to be the last word in our lives or in God'E vorld.
This central affirmation of the Christian faith can and hould
reorient the perspective of every Christian,29 including the per ective
of both Christian physicians and Christian patients. To sh ~ ~ that
belief in the resurrection is to share the willingness to brir every
point-of-view under the critical and transforming power of C ist the ·
Lord.

1. The Christian Physician
The physician ·who is a Christian will recognize life as a gU 0f God
and as the intention of God. He will never intend death, bu on the
contrary, will intend life and its flourishing. He will see hi
edical
knowledge and technology as gifts of God to serve His caus md His
creatures; he will see his role as a calling. So far, the resurrec m faith
supports and sustains the physician's perspective. But he \ · realize
that the victory over death is finally a divine victory an
n escha·
tological victory, not a human ·one, and surely not a techno!~ .cal one.
So he will not deny the limits of his art or' the truth about
r world.
His affirmation of the resurrection in a world like this one f.' bles and
requires a critical reconstruction of the physician 's persp' ive, sustaining but limiting the intention to preserve life, chal! ging the
"medicalization" of care by his respect for the integrity a · . m bodie~
persons, and truthfully acknowledging the limits of his ~- In this
section, I hope to develop the suggestions contained in t l:' ,, last sentence.
The Christian physician will not deny the truth abo ' .:mr world.
People die, and some die horribly. Moreover, sometimes m a wo~ld
like this one , to preserve life is not to serve God's cause . , life a~d Its
flourishing. The medical service to God 's cause of human f r_mrishl~g IS
the service to health, and, in a world like this one, l' sometimes
minimally the restoration or preservation ·of the capacit : for hu~an
relationships and /or the relief of pain. To affirm the resur~ectio_n IS t~
intend life and its flourishing. The Christian physician w1ll not 1~te\
death, will not practice hospitality toward it, but wher, resistwg 1
holds no promise of either the restoration of a capacity for human
relationships or the relief of pain, he may allow it its apparent. victor~,
confident of God's final triumph.
. t
The Christian physician will not deny, either, the limit~ of hiS;~
The victory over death is not, finally, a technological VICt_orY- fter
limits of the art are not only our indefeasible mortali~y _whic~; aediall, is simply the truth about our world again, but the hm1ts of m . g
calization" for proper care of patients and , especially, of d_Y 1~,
patients. Stanley Hauerwas calls medicine ;,a tragic profe~s!O ur
because it reflects the limits of our existence, 3o and not just ID 0
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m~rtality but " in t he conflicting claims upon us, in our necessary
faithfulness to parochial but nevert heless overriding obligations, in our
self-made disasters and errors, and oft en in our helplessness. " 31 It is
not Hauerwas's claim that medicine is more t ragic t han other aspect s
of our Jives, but that its practice essentially manifests and embodies
the tragic nature of our existence. Yet m edicine has sometimes denied
the truth to dying patients and even t o itself, when it has de nied t hat
some are " overmastered by th eir di seases ." It was not always so , as we
have seen. B~t since Bacon , t h e alliance .with science and technology
and the great successes of modern m edicine, t he lim its of the art have
been hidden and the proper sense of the t ragic diminished. Without
the. acknowledgment of the limits of t he art and without the appropriate sense of .the tragic, the profession is tempted t o resist deat h
even when treatment holds no promise of either t he possibility of
human relationships or t He relief of pairi. It is t empt ed to the presumption that the victory ~ver deat h and evil is a technological victory
rather than an eschatological one. Without the acknowledgment of the
limits of the art and without the appropriate sense of t he tragic, of the
"not yet" character of our existen ce, t he profession 's capacity and
responsibility to care even when it cannot cure may not be sustainable.
The problem is compounded and exacerbat ed because of the limits
of " medicalization" for proper care of patients. With science as ally,
treatment has shifted from pat ients to pathologies, from persons to
problems. This shift itself participates in t he tragic character of medicine as a profession at least if it is t rue that error in medicine is not
.
'
just the result of scientific ignorance or technological ineptitude, but
sometimes the result of the necessary fallibil ity of attempts to understand particulars:__ and especially persons w ith a history- as the sumtotal of the · physical and chemical mechanisms which operate on
them.
·
However that may be, the Christ ian physician , by his affirmation of
the resurrection of the body, can be and ought to be reminded that
the body is not just related to nature, is not just the sum-total of the
Physical and chemical mechanisms which operate on it, but is intimately related to one 's own identity, and that it is by and in the body
that we relate tci other p ersons and t o God. "I believe in . . . the
resurrection of the body ~ ' can reorient the physician 's· perspective
toward the body. At least that central affirmation of the Christian
faith can illumine parts of the situation of the patient which remain in
the shadows when the focus is on pathologies or medical problems.
~e integrity, the wholeness, or- to use a word (formerly) important
Ill Roman Catholic medical ethics - the " totality" of the patient
may not be overlooked or ignored if we believe the body not just to
be a machine or a mortal coil to ·be left behind by some immortal
spirit, but essentially part of our identity, and not just as individuals,
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but as related to others. The affirmation of the resurrectio n
the
body thus grounds and nurtures a concern for and a respect · the
integrity of patients. Then physicians will hesitate to refer to p . ents
as "the cardiac arrest' in room 512" or "the cancer in roo m :)3."
They will happily honor the human want and need to be ident i d, to
be named, to be an individual rather than a case. More importa1 '! for
our purpose, then, decisions concerning the treatment of p ents,
including especially the treatment of dying patients, may no t , alto·
gether " medical" decisions. They must be decisions concerned r and
respectful toward the patient 's integrity, his identity, his reh· m to
others and to God, and toward the "embodiment" of that totai
Such decisions, of course, can only be made in honest com •· ;ation
with the patient, i:f competent, or with friends, family, cler r. if the
patient is incompetent . Iri conversation, the physician will disc 'Jr the
patient's identity and learn what respect for the patient's i egrity
may mean. The physician does not participate in this com >ation
merely as a servant of the patient's integrity, 33 but as the sf; :1nt of
Christ the Lord in his special role or vocation of physician. H • .vill be
an advocate for life, and if it is a rnatter of choosing ways of c· ng,he
will be an advocate neither of denying death nor of practici1 hospitality toward death, but, rather, of living the last days 1n wa: which
embody confidence in God's final triumph in spite of deat h ·ld suffering. He will reserve the right to disagree with the patient 's cision
and to attempt to dissuade him of it.
The "medicalization" of care can be a species of tech,. ological
pride, of the presumption that all problems are, at bottom , t ct nological problems and that technology, given time, will solve t h ern . It is a
position which lacks the eschatological realism and the hum ai, realism
of the community which acknowledges the resurrection in a world
where death and evil still apparently reign. That realism insi.st s that
human flourishing is threatened most of all by ills which have no
technological solution, and indeed, sometimes, this side o f t h e eschaton, rio solution at all. This is not a call for a casual anti-technological
spirit. It will hardly do to rest content with objections to t ech nology
as "playing God." Dominion in this world is given to hum an ity as a
mandate and as a blessing. The question is not whether or not we will
play God, but whether or not we will exercise our God-given powers
responsibly. Christians can commit the sih of sloth as well as t he sin of
pride with technology. But the "medicalization" of care t em pts c~n
temporary physicians to pride more often than to sloth, and m y pomt
is that the affirmation of the resurrection reorients the Christian
physician's perspective also to technology and enables and requ~es
him to repent of technological pride. For all its promises and all_Its
accomplishments, technology has yet to deliver us, ahd will not deliver
us, from our finitude or to our flourishing. We may not deny ~ec~?~~
logy, but neither may we deify it. It is not "our faithful savwr.

does not "keep covenant." It is God Who brings new heaven and a
new earth, not technology . The victory over disease and death remains
a divine victory, not a technological one. Then it may be possible to
lower expectations and demands also of medical technology, once
again to admit that sometimes - however sadly or tragically - one is
overmastered by this disease, to respond in other than technological
ways to these threats to human flourishing, and indeed to limit the
· careless meddling of technologists in a patient's living of his final days.
The technological imperative that "if we can, we must" is a technologic which has no s~anding in human logic or in the rules of Christian
discourse.
The Christian physician will deny neither the truth about our world
nor the limits of his art, but neither will he deny the resurrection or
withstand the intention of God disclosed in it. He will intend life and
its flourishing for his patients, and will not deny death, nor simply
accept it, but will resist it up to the limits suggested above. In view of
the relation of life to human flourishing in God's intention, the physician may allow death its apparent triumph when resisting it holds
neither promise of the restoration of a capacity for human relationships nor hope for the relief of pain. In view of the "embodiment" of
the person, he may allow choices concerning ways of living while
dying which cohere with and serve a person's integrity. He is neither
the servant of technology nor the servant of the patient; he is the
servant of a risen Christ.

2. The Christian Patient
The patient who is a Christian will also recognize life as a gift of
God and as the intention of God disclosed in the resurrection. And he,
too, will acknowledge the sad realities of our world this side of God 's
final triumph and live in it under the sign of the cross. But for him,
too, to say "God raised Jesus from the dead" is to say "This Jesus is
~ord" a~d, :o quote from the Heidelberg Catechism, "My only comfo_rt · · . m l~fe ~nd deat~ is t~at I am not m~ own but belong to the
a~thful Savwr. ' The aff1rmatwn that God ra1sed Jesus from the dead
should reorient the so-called patient-perspective, too.
~he Christian patient may be content neither with the assertion of
P~tlent autonomy which some are recommending nor with the passiVity of the sick-role. One who acknowledges Jesus (or anyone) as Lord
~n hardly claim to be autonomous, at least in the sense of being "a
· :to oneself." The Christian's comfort is that he is not his own . The
~ itrary freedom to will one thing one moment and another the next
~ not what the Christian claims for himself. The freedom to resist
f ~~ gifts and intentions is not something the Christian would claim
or •mself. The freedom to serve Christ, the freedom of being under
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His reign is the freedom Christians claim, but it is si~ply not <:> be
identified with a neutral autonomy or liberty. To be free u n c · His
reign is to be obliged, to be responsible to Him for our cond1 and
character even as (or especially as) evil and death assert their . -wers
against his intentions.
Precisely because the Christian is obliged - and, perhaps, es .::ially
obliged - in the midst of suffering and death, he cannot ac< ,t the
passivity which is his virtual identity as a patient according to e sick
role. He will reject -if he can - the reduction of his p c m to
"patient," to "sufferer," to passive recipient of treatment. H e 11 and
must, given his affirmation of the resurrection, bring a dispo
on to
must
choose life and health to the relationship with his doctor and
wever,
be an active participant in his own care. What he may as;ert ,
as we have said, is not his autonomy, but his integrity, his ide · ty, his
" right," founded not in some neutral autonomy but in the 2edom
and obligation of Christ 's Lordship to "strut his stuff" to the nd and
dying
at the end, to use Joe Sandwich's phrase. He may seize his 0 '
definias an exceptional opportunity to give his Christian integrity
tive and final form.
His obligation is rather to help, to care, to restore, tore\_ ·cile, to
. overcome evil with good, to "glorify God in your body" (I <.. . 6:20).
The law of his being is faith and love.-Of course, he is riot t· : elcome
death, not to practice hospitality toward it. Christ Himsell ught to
have the cup removed , but God's cause and His own inte 1 y never·
theless brought Him to it. It is life that is to be celebrated a ' toasted,
not death. And the slogans which express - and shape - , , dispositions to death will not be "natural death" or "death with ;:;nity" or
"a right to die," curious slogans all for a faith which · >ks for a
kingdom in which " death shall be no more" (Rev~ 21 :4 ). _-., hich sees
death as an indignity, 34 and which chooses life and hum. , flourishing. The slogans which-express the Christian patient's per ,>ective are
rather to be like Donne's "Death, be not proud" and Pa ' "' Death is
swallowed up in victory" (I Cor. 15:54).
These slogans do not deny death, and surely do not det~:, t he Christian's own death . They do not merely accept death , rot even the
Christian's own death, but surely not the sad and horriblt' deaths of
the hungry, the innocent, the despised. They call Christians, in life and
in death, to serve God's cause, to resist and subvert the reign of death
and evil. The martyrs knew it well: their own survival counted less
than God's cause, their integrity, and their neighbor 's - indeed the!r
enemy's- welfare. Their "comfort" was that they were not the!I'
own, but belonged in life and death to their faithful savior, and thell'
comfort was their courage.
In more mundane and commonplace ways, the sam e co urage and
integrity, the same self-forgetfulness in concern for the neighbor, can
and should mark the character and conduct of the Christian patient.
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Our comfort remains our co urage to live our lives and die our deaths
with Christian integrity . If it merely makes us " comfortable" like an
air-conditioned sanctuary or hospital room makes us "comfortable "
~hen it is not the comfort, the cum-fortis, the enabling and strengthe~
mg, of submission to Christ's kingdom. The Christian's comfort calls
· him to live his life, even the dying of it, in ways that serve God and
help the victims of this sad world 's evil, especially those to be grieved
or conscience-stricken by his death.
.
The Christian patient, then, may refuse scarce medical treatment so
that another might live. He may refuse that medical treatment which
bears nb promise of enabling him to be anything besides a continual
burden and drain on his family or on its (and society's) resources. He
may refuse treatments which render his final minutes or days or years
le~s promising to the tasks of reconciliation and forgiveness and joy
WI_t~ family, friends, and enemies. He may choose treatments which
mitigate suffering and pain, even while they risk death. Because Jesus
has been raised, he may never simply choose death ; but because the
One Who "':as raised walked among us caring and helping, teaching and
de~o~stratmg the love of God and neighbor, and was crucified, the
Chn_stian patient may weigh other goods against the good of his own
s~val and may discern that he has duties which override the good of
5m:'Ival, duties which should determine how he lives, also while he is
d~mg. So his life and his dying may be like that of a martyr, "bearing
Witness" (gk. marty reo) to the truth.

3. The Christian Community
Such duties or such an identity may not be imposed on patients

e~en on Christian patients, surely not by physicians especially physi~
Ciat~s who would learn from one patient to help, another. Indeed

· ·
·
hpa Ient d eclSlons
hke
these should not be quickly supported or even'
T~~or~d ?~ other interes~ed parties, including physician and family.
but he YSICian, we have said, must respect the integrity of the patient,
se
.does no~ become a servant of the patient; he remains the
·. dirvant of . the nsen Christ. The Christian physician will sometimes
_sagree. With the decision of the Christian patient may attempt to
dIssuade h ·
· to be a party to It.
. It Is,
. ' I thmk,
.
Ill k
Im, and refuse
another
ard of the "not yet" chfiracter of our existence that goods real
go 0 s co
.
.
.
,
be ' me mto conflict, real conflict. Some conflicts are inevitable
cause
of
the
pl
al"t
f
.
.
.
.
God . .
ur I Y o goods mvolved m the human flounshmg
tion Intends. Our problem is less that we are ignorant of God's intencon~i~~d· mo~e that part of what we know to be God's intention
f!~_,, . In this sad world with other goods we know to be part of
'-'VU s Intention
1
th do not cl~m the moral competence to resolve such dilemmas;
ey are, after all , rea1 conflicts of real goods. It is here - if not
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the
· before - that procedural solutions are typically applied.
absence of certainty about the right decision , the argument g' >, let
the doctor make it or let the patient make it. There may fina ll: Je no
way to avoid such a procedural solution, and if it comes to U · . as a
last resort, then the patient's decision is "trump. " 3 5 In such situa·
tion of last resort, the best we can do is the assertion of rights d the
calculation of fair conditions for overriding a patient's dec m, as
Childress supplies. Only let us not deny that such a solution i
tragrc
one, one marked by the " not yet" character of our existence.
Neither the Christian physician nor the Christian patier. .hould
rush to such a confrontation of power or " rights" as that in '' ·~ hone
ends · up powerful and the other powerless. The check on Sl'
a rush
to confrontation is the axiom of the kingdom which tun : onvenst, and
tional judgments concerning power around : "the last shall bt
6; Lk.
the first last" (Mk. 10:31 and par.; Mk. 9:35,36; Matt. 2
humble
13:30), and also "the exalted shall be humbled, and t l
side of
exalted" (Matt. 23:12; Lk. 14:11, 18 :14). Such axioms, t
'Jteover,
the escaton, take the shape of imperatives:3 6 Such axioms.
wer of a
are given concrete and normative expression· in the curiom
cross. To affirm the resurrection of the one who taught t b · nd died
.. thus is to be disposed, I think, not to exercise power or .t o · ert one's
rights in order to render the other powerless in the confro . Lion, but
to reason together, to talk ·and pray together, and to ask · c'ir Chris·
tian communities for advice and discernment.
I am not suggesting that clergy be asked to provide re:;, n ses or to
articulate canon law. I am rather suggesting the import ce of 'the
Christian community as a community of moral discour:· ..tnd moral
discernment for Christians. It is there the Christian mont • .radition rs
borne· it is there the story is told; it is there, "where tw . .)r three are
gathe;ed in (His) name," that the risen Christ is "in . ''"' mi~st . of
them" (Mt. 18:20). These decisions ought not to be wr Chnstran
patients purely private decisions or for Christian phy;,:,·1 ans ~urely
professional decisions. They ought to be made with Ch -istian mteg·
rity, that is, within the context of the Christian comm umty's common
faith and common life.
.d
The Christian community may never abandon care for t he sick an
dying to the medical profession nor may it abandon th e p?ysiciant~~
science. It is gifted and called to support both the art of ctymg ~nd d
art of medicine. The Church may honor the role bo.th_of ~he d~mg ~~e
of the physician, and call them to the shape of Chnstran mtegntY ·. ed
duty to visit the sick is not merely quaint and must not be permrtt t
.d uppor
to become banal. There is also a duty, I think, to ~rov r e s d in
groups, at least informally, for physicians. Such practrc.es are go~ IIY
their own right, but my interest now is that they ?Je mstrumen asa·
good, both to make the Christian community available for conve\y
tions about such dilemmas and to make the Christian communi

mor-e skilled and sensitive as a community of moral discourse and
discernment concerning such issues.
The Christian community will support the physician and admonish
him to critically reconstruct his perspective, to acknowledge the truth
about our world and the limits of its art, and to respe ct the integrity
of the patient. The Christian community will also support th e patient
and admonish him to critically reconstruct his perspective, to be
· · neither a law to himself nor passive, but to be true to his identity and
a grateful steward of God's gifts. The Christian community will support not only physician and patient, but their relationship. Because of
the Church's understanding of power from the perspective of standing
with the crucified One Who was raised, the Church will resist both the
model of philanthropy and the model of contract t o construe and
support their relationship. The model of philanthropy places all power
in the hands of the physician and makes the patient the passive recipient of the good the doctor dispenses. The model of contract places all
Power in the hands of the patient and renders the physician the hired
hand, the animated tool, of the patient. Instead of either philanthropy
or contract, the Church will understand and support their relationshp
as a special covenant .bond. Covenant, of course, binds people together
precisely because they are together bound to God, the CovenantMaker and Covenant-Keeper. The special bond established between
Physician and patient may not, within the Christian community, be
abstracted from the responsiveness of both to God or from the story
of God's gifts and intentions, which is to say, in the new covenant
·from the story of God raising Jesus Who both healed and suffered. 37
Such a model . will not enable physician and patient always to agree,
?ut it may enable them always to talk, always to respect, and even to
mstruct one another concerning Christian integrity in their respective
and different roles. It may enable them to avoid the sometimes tragic
consequences of hastening to the last resort. It may protect medical
care from arbitrary dominance and patient courage from foolish
autonomy.
Of course, if the Christian community is to support and sustain
such medical care and patient courage, it is terribly important thatthe
Ch~rch gets its s'tory straight. There has been and is plenty of deathdemal and ~ven hospit;1lity toward death in our theology and in our
fu.nerals and in our practice. Moreover, we cannot expect to think
With Christian integrity on one issue if we do not get our story straight
on many issues, including the reign of death by hunger and violence. I
~ led, thus, to repeat the caveat s with · which this section began.
th~t, _I am .not so presumptuous as to think ~oral discer~ment of
te se Issues 1s a task for which I or any other smgle person Is compe. nt. It is a communal task the task of a community which lives in
mtegrr·t Y out of and toward' the resurrection. Second, the Chnstran
..
cornm 't
um Y should not be so presumptuous as to think we are morally
I
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better than non-Christians, but we are given a peculictr ide n y to
which we may and must be truthful. Let it be said in closing t t the
first and final responsibility of the Church is to tell the story Jt of
which and toward which she lives and to invite people to sha; their
conduct, their character, their living and their dying, to its m ative,
to make the story their story.
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